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VIRGINIA SHOULD ABOLISH THE ARCHAIC TORT
DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
ADOPT A COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE IN
ITS PLACE
Peter Nash Swisher *
I. INTRODUCTION
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a proximate cause to the tortuous harm the plain-
tiff has suffered, which falls below the standard of care to which
the plaintiff is required to conform for his or her own protection.'
When contributory negligence is found, it constitutes a complete
defense to the plaintiffs negligence cause of action, even though
the defendant's negligence may have greatly exceeded the plain-
tiffs negligence.'
This rather severe legal doctrine that the plaintiffs contributo-
ry negligence would constitute a complete defense to the plaintiffs
negligence cause of action-even though the defendant's conduct
may be far more negligent than the plaintiffs conduct-was first
enunciated in the 1809 English case of Butterfield v. Forrester.3 In
Butterfield, Lord Ellenborough, a controversial and tempestuous
Tory judge in his own day, cited no supporting authority, nor gave
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; J.D., 1973, University of
California, Hastings College of Law; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; B.A., 1966, Amherst
College.
1. E.g., Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137,149, 597 S.E.2d 64, 71 (2004); Lerwill v. Regent
Van & Storage, Inc., 217 Va. 490, 493-94, 496, 229 S.E.2d 880, 882-84 (1976); Char-
lottesville Music Ctr., Inc. v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 37, 205 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463, at 506-07 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Keffer, 272 Va. 162, 167-68, 630 S.E.2d 297, 300-01 (2006);
Litchford v. Hancock, 232 Va. 496, 499, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1987); Fein v. Wade, 191 Va.
203, 209-10, 61 S.E.2d 29, 31-32 (1950).
3. (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.) 926-27; 11 East 60, 60-61.
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any satisfactory explanation for this draconic legal doctrine.' As
Professor Dan Dobbs has observed:
[This] rule was extreme. The plaintiff who was guilty of only slight
or trivial negligence was barred completely, even if the defendant
was guilty of quite serious negligence, as contemporary courts have
had occasion to observe in criticizing the rule. The traditional con-
tributory negligence rule was extreme not merely in results but in
principle. No satisfactory reasoning has ever explained the rule. It
departed seriously from ideals of accountability and deterrence [in
tort law] because it completely relieved the defendant from liability
even if he was by far the most negligent actor. A regime of accounta-
bility would, in contrast, hold the defendant liable for a proportion-
ate share of the harm [under the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence].5
Accordingly, forty-six states to date have abolished this archaic
doctrine of contributory negligence, by judicial or legislative ac-
tion, and in its place have adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence.6 In contrast to contributory negligence, comparative
negligence acts not as a complete bar to the plaintiffs recovery in
tort, but only as a partial bar, resulting in a percentage reduction
from otherwise recoverable damages awarded to the plaintiff.
Virginia and four other jurisdictions, however, still recognize the
traditional tort defense of contributory negligence.'
The purpose of this essay is to argue that the time has now
come for Virginia, by judicial or legislative action, to abolish its
archaic common law tort defense of contributory negligence and
replace it with a comparative negligence defense. Adopting a
comparative negligence defense would more equitably and more
fairly recognize and apportion damages according to the bedrock
4. See id.
5. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 199, at 494-95 (2000).
6. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ WITH EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.01, at
3-4 (5th ed. 2010) ("By 1994, comparative negligence had replaced contributory negligence
as a complete defense in . forty-six states ."); HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE,
COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:11, at 19-25 (3d ed. 1996).
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 31; WOODS & DEERE, supra note 6, § 22:2, at
502, 504.
8. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia still
continue to recognize the traditional tort defense of contributory negligence. VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 621
(12th ed. 2010); see also Burroughs v. Keffer, 272 Va. 162, 167, 630 S.E.2d 297, 300 (2006);
Faith v. Keefer, 736 A.2d 422, 443 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach.
Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993).
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underlying tort legal principles of accountability, deterrence, and
distribution of loss.9
II. HISTORY AND RATIONALE FOR THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of contributory negligence had its origin in the
English case of Butterfield v. Forrester.10 In that case, the plaintiff
was injured by a fall from his horse when, riding at a fast pace,
he ran into an obstruction in the road left by the defendant.n
Lord Ellenborough held that, under these particular circumstanc-
es, the plaintiff was absolutely barred from any recovery based on
his contributory negligence, even though the defendant's negli-
gent conduct also was a significant cause of the plaintiffs inju-
*12ries.
Contributory negligence entered American jurisprudence six-
teen years later in the Massachusetts case of Smith v. Smith,"
and in the Vermont case of Washburn v. Tracy.14 In the space of a
few decades, the doctrine of contributory negligence gained al-
most unanimous acceptance within the United States, "rapidly
spread[ing], 'not unlike an unchecked conflagration in a wind-
storm' throughout the country," thus becoming "a [well-
]recognized part of American common law."" Indeed, its complete
acceptance in the nineteenth century is illustrated by a Pennsyl-
vania judge in 1854 who stated that the defense of contributory
negligence was "a rule of law from time immemorial" which was
"not likely to be changed in all time to come."" But like many
9. DOBBS, supra note 5, § 1, at 1, § 8, at 12-13, § 9, at 13-14, § 10, at 17-18, § 11, at
19; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 21-26 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.
1984); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, at 29-31 (2000) (abolishing the doc-
trine of contributory negligence and replacing it with comparative negligence).
10. (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.) 927; 11 East 60, 61.
11. Id. at 926-27; 11 East at 60.
12. Id. at 927; 11 East at 61.
13. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824) ("[T]his action cannot be maintained, unless the
plaintiff can show that he used ordinary care; for without that, it is by no means certain
that he himself was not the cause of his own injury.").
14. 2D Chip. 128 (Vt. 1824) ("[Ilf it appear[s] that the injury complained of would not
have happened, but for a want of ordinary care and diligence in the plaintiff, the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover.").
15. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 12:2, at 249-50
(2008) (citations omitted).
16. R.R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149 (Pa. 1854).
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other nineteenth century economic philosophies and common law
doctrines, the doctrine of contributory negligence was not des-
tined to last permanently in the vast majority of American
states. "
What were the reasons and underlying justifications for adopt-
ing the defense of contributory negligence in nineteenth century
America? A number of reasons for the adoption of the contributo-
ry negligence doctrine have been given over the years. "All of
[these purported reasons] have been the subject of [severe] criti-
cism," and "[n]one of them appear convincing."1
The wide acceptance of this "all or nothing" defense of contribu-
tory negligence is perhaps best explained by the fact that this le-
gal doctrine emerged just as the Industrial Revolution was get-
ting underway. It may well have been that as a matter of legal
and social policy, the doctrine of contributory negligence was wel-
comed to protect infant American industries from overly sympa-
thetic juries involved in workplace-related accidents.19 As Judge
D. Arthur Kelsey observes:
In theory, but hardly in practice, employees in [nineteenth] century
factories were protected by their employer's duty "to provide employ-
ees with a reasonably safe place in which to work." Whatever succor
this duty provided to employees, it soon surrendered to the "unholy
trinity" of employer defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and the fellow servant rule. They became the "wicked sisters" of
the common law because, working together, they effectively nullified
any realistic possibility of holding an employer liable for the great
majority of on-the-job injuries. 20
17. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 6.
18. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 15, § 12:4, at 254.
[T]he courts often employed the rationale that the plaintiffs negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident or was an intervening, insulating cause
between the defendant's negligence and the injury. . [S]ome of the early
adopting courts took the position that, similarly to the clean hands doctrine
in equity, the contributory negligence doctrine was intended to punish the
plaintiff for his own misconduct. Still another reason given for the defense of
contributory negligence is that it is intended to discourage accidents by deny-
ing recovery to those who fail to use proper care for their own safety.
Id. § 12:4, at 254-55 (citations omitted).
19. William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 468-69 (1953);
see also Gardner v. Geraghty, 423 N.E.2d 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon,
84 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Mich. 1957).
20. D. Arthur Kelsey, Social Compact as Law: The Workers' Compensation Act and the
Wicked Sisters of the Common Law, VBA NEWS J., Oct./Nov. 2005, at 13 (quoting Fields v.
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However, since the adoption of workers' compensation statutes
in all fifty states, including Virginia, in the early twentieth centu-
ry, this legal and social rationale for contributory negligence as
applied to workplace-related accidents ceased to have any viable
justification. In 1918, the Virginia General Assembly enacted
Virginia's first workers' compensation legislation, largely modeled
on Indiana's workers' compensation statutes.2 '
Basically, under applicable Virginia workers' compensation
statutes, in exchange for giving up the right to file a lawsuit
against an employer for a job-related injury, the claimant em-
ployee has the advantage of not having to prove any negligence
against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits.
"Furthermore, the employer generally does not have available to
it the defenses of contributory negligence [or] assumption of ...
risk by the claimant employee, except for a few" statutory areas
involving willful negligence or intentional misconduct.2 3
Another nineteenth century justification of the application of a
contributory negligence defense involved personal injury suits
brought by railroad employees against the railroads. Various
courts feared that railroads would be "perceived by many jurors
to be impersonal and potentially harmful entities with deep pock-
ets."2 4 This nineteenth century social and legal concern has been
subsequently addressed by remedial statutory law. Today, a com-
parative negligence defense, and not contributory negligence, ap-
plies in Virginia under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2 5
Virginia Ry. Co., 114 Va. 558, 561, 77 S.E. 501, 502 (1913)); see also PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 9, § 80, at 568-72; Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social
Change and the Law ofIndustrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 52-53 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Richmond Cedar Works v. Harper, 129 Va. 481, 488, 106 S.E. 516, 519
(1921) ("The Virginia [workers' compensation] act ... has for its humane purpose the
providing for all workmen coming within its provisions who are injured during the course
of their employment of compensation therefor which is certain in amount without deduc-
tion.") (emphasis added).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007); PETER N. SWISHER, ROBERT E.
DRAIM & DAVID HUDGINS, VIRGINIA TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 18.1, at 488 (2010).
23. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 22, § 18.1, at 488-89 (emphasis added); accord Fauver
v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 522, 65 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1951); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 98, 38
S.E.2d 73, 73 (1946); Farmers' Mfg. Co. v. Warfel, 144 Va. 98, 103-04, 131 S.E. 240, 241-
42 (1926).
24. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 6, § 1:4, at 6; accord Wex S. Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 155-57 (1946).
25. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (2006).
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which governs suits brought by railroad employees against their
employers.2 6
Therefore, lacking any modern justification or rationale, in law
or social policy, the archaic nineteenth century defense of con-
tributory negligence should now be abolished in Virginia, either
by legislative or judicial action, like it has been abolished in forty-
six other states, in favor of a modern comparative negligence de-
fense in tort.2 7
III. THE EMERGENCE AND ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE IN THE VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICAN STATES TODAY
Comparative negligence is a relatively recent legal concept,
having been first enunciated by Professors A. Chambers Mole and
Lyman Wilson in a scholarly 1932 law review article. 28 By the
time Professor Ernest Turk wrote his 1950 law review article en-
titled Comparative Negligence on the March,2 9 and Professor Wil-
liam Prosser wrote his 1953 law review article on Comparative
26. E.g., Stover v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 249 Va. 192, 199, 455 S.E.2d 238, 242 (1995);
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hodges, 248 Va. 254, 260-62, 448 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1994); Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 217 Va. 258, 261, 227 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1976); Seaboard
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Ward, 214 Va. 543, 545, 202 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1974). But see Chan-
dler v. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-81 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting
application of the Virginia railroad comparative negligence law in a truck/train collision).
Although this is a federal statute, legal actions may be brought in a Virginia state court.
See generally SWISHER ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.50, at 139-40.
27. There still appears to be a misguided, and unsubstantiated, opinion in some quar-
ters that if Virginia, as a pro-business state, retains its traditional common law defense of
contributory negligence, this will-in some way-influence a number of new businesses to
relocate to Virginia. The truth is that other pro-business states, such as Texas, North Car-
olina, and Nevada, that are listed higher than Virginia in "best states to do business" have
all adopted a comparative negligence regime, without any apparent harm to their pro-
business competitiveness. See, e.g., Gregory J. Gilligan, State Wins High Business Rank-
ing, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2008 at B9.
Virginia stood out in this year's rankings [listed at number four among the
best states to do business] because the state has maintained low jobless levels
and has had a good pace of growth . . . "CEOs consider Virginia to be a nice
place to live and hire people, evidenced by their A-rating for work-force quali-
ty and living environment."
Id. Governor Bob McDonnell stated "[wle don't have public sector unions in Virginia, we
have a right-to-work state, we have very few unions overall, and it's one of the great sell-
ing points that I've got to be able to attract business [to Virginia]." Olympia Meola, Wis-
consin's Unrest Unlikely in Virginia, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 2011, at Al.
28. A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17
CORNELL L.Q. 333 (1932).
29. Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189
(1950).
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Negligence," only five states had recognized comparative negli-
gence in one form or another.3 1 By 1992, however, most states had
abolished the archaic legal doctrine of contributory negligence,
and had adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence in its
place, by legislative or judicial action.
Modern comparative negligence law, rather than barring all
recovery by the plaintiff, reduces the plaintiffs recovery in pro-
portion to the plaintiffs fault.33 This concept largely evolved from
admiralty law, 34 and from the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
which governed lawsuits brought by railroad employees against
their employers." Today, forty-six states recognize some form of
comparative negligence, either through a pure or a modified com-
parative negligence regime.3 6
Pure comparative negligence applies comparative fault to all
plaintiffs in negligence cases. Under this system, no plaintiff is
completely barred from recovery based on his or her contributory
negligence." Twelve states, and many federal statutes, have
adopted a pure comparative negligence regime.3
Modified comparative negligence continues to utilize a tradi-
tional "complete bar" rule when the plaintiffs negligence reaches
a specific break-point.3 9 In twenty-one states, the plaintiff is com-
pletely barred from any recovery if his or her negligence exceeds
or is greater than the negligence of the defendant, under a so-
called "greater than 50%" approach.40
30. Prosser, supra note 19.
31. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 1.01, at 2 (Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Da-
kota, Wisconsin, and Arkansas adopted the comparative negligence principle in 1955, with
Puerto Rico following in 1956, and Maine in 1965.).
32. Id. § 1.04, at 13-17, § 1.05, at 17-29.
33. Id. § 2.01, at 32.
34. See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 12-4, at
730-31 (2d ed. 1994) ("[L]iability for such [maritime] damage is to be allocated among the
parties proportionally to the comparative degree of their fault.").
35. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
36. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 1.01, at 3-4.
37. Id. § 2.01, at 32-33, § 3.02, at 62-64.
38. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 6, § 1.11, at 19-23. Alaska, California, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
and Washington follow a system of pure comparative negligence. Id.
39. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 33-34.
40. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 6, § 1.11, at 23-24. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
3652011]
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Twelve other states apply an "alternate 'modified' system of
comparative negligence," holding that the plaintiff is completely
barred from any tort recovery "if his or her negligence is equal to
or greater than defendant's negligence under a so-called '50% or
greater approach."'4 1
Adoption of this better-reasoned comparative negligence rule
means that the doctrine of contributory negligence no longer ap-
plies as a complete bar to any tort recovery. "In effect, contributo-
ry negligence remains a partial bar to the extent that plaintiffs
negligence shall proportionately reduce the amount of damages
attributable to the entire injury to which a nonnegligent plaintiff
would be entitled."4 2 Accordingly, there are still elements of con-
tributory negligence found "in both of the 'modified' comparative
negligence systems, and as the Michigan Supreme Court ob-
served, these 'modified' comparative negligence rules do not com-
pletely eliminate the traditional bar of contributory negligence-
they only 'lower the barrier."'4 3
Comparative negligence clearly is the better-reasoned solution
to an archaic and obsolete nineteenth century doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence in fostering and furthering bedrock tort law
principles of proportionate compensation to the plaintiff for his or
her injuries, legal accountability of both parties, equitable distri-
bution of loss, and deterrence of similar misconduct by the de-
fendant.4 4 As one commentator persuasively states the case for
comparative negligence:
The predominant argument for abandonment of contributory negli-
gence rests, of course, upon the undeniable inequity and injustice in
casting an entire accidental loss upon a plaintiff whose negligence
combined with another's negligence in causing the loss suffered, no
matter how trifling plaintiffs negligence might be. Liability based on
fault is the cornerstone of tort law, and a system such as contributo-
Wisconsin, and Wyoming forbid a plaintiff from recovering if his negligence is greater than
half. Id.
41. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 22, § 3:49, at 138. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia
follow this approach. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 6, § 1.11, at 24-25.
42. SPEISER ETAL., supra note 15, § 13:1, at 483.
43. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 22, § 3:49, at 143 (quoting Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. 1979)).
44. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 5, § 1, at 1-2, § 10, at 17-18, § 11, at 19; PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 1, at 4, 6, § 4, at 21-26; Prosser, supra note
19, at 468-69; Turk, supra note 29, at 195-97. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, §
1.01, at 2-5; WOODs & DEERE, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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ry negligence-which permits one of the contributing wrongdoers to
avoid all liability-simply does not serve any principle of fault liabil-
ity.45
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that now is an appropri-
ate time for the Virginia General Assembly, or the Supreme
Court Virginia, or both, to re-assess the archaic and obsolete
nineteenth century judge-made law of contributory negligence in
light of the needs of contemporary Virginia society, and seriously
"consider whether . . . adopting the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence would be in the best interests of all the citizens of Virgin-
ia."46
IV. SHOULD COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE BE ADOPTED
BY THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OR THE
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA?
Assuming that Virginia should abolish its obsolete nineteenth
century doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of a compara-
tive negligence regime, a final question remains: Who should
make this decision to abolish contributory negligence and adopt
comparative negligence-the Virginia General Assembly, or the
Supreme Court of Virginia?
A number of states have adopted comparative negligence by
statutory enactment through their state legislatures. 47 "In 1969
and 1970 [for example], Minnesota, New Hampshire, Hawaii,
Vermont, and Massachusetts adopted modified comparative neg-
ligence [statutes]."4 8 Subsequently, in 1971, Colorado, Idaho, and
45. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 15, § 13:5, at 522-23. There are no serious commenta-
tors today who would argue that the archaic contributory negligence defense is superior in
any way to comparative negligence in contemporary American tort law. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB., supra note 9, § 3, at 29-30
(abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence,
where a plaintiff's negligence only reduces his or her recovery, rather than totally barring
plaintiffs recovery).
46. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 22, § 3:49, at 139.
47. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 13-17 (discussing state legisla-
tive adoption of comparative negligence).
48. Id. at 16; Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as amend-
ed MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (2005)); Act of Aug. 12, 1969, ch. 225, 1969 N.H. Laws 177
(codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (2006)); Act of July 14, 1969, Act
227, 2969 Haw. Sess. Laws 422 (codified as amended HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (2005));
Act of Apr. 1, 1970, No. 234, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 193 (Adj. Sess.) (codified as amend-
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Oregon also enacted modified comparative negligence statutes,
while Rhode Island enacted a pure comparative negligence stat-
ute.49 In 1973, "[e]ight states-Connecticut, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming-adopted
... modified forms of comparative negligence, and Washington
[State] adopted [a] pure form [of comparative negligence]."so In
the following years, "comparative negligence has been adopted by
[statute] in Kansas (1974, modified form), Montana (1975, modi-
fied form), New York (1975, pure form), Pennsylvania (1976, mod-
ified form), Ohio (1980, modified form), Louisiana (1979, pure
form), Iowa (1984, modified form), Indiana, (1983, modified form),
Arizona (1984, pure form), and Delaware (1984, modified form).""
In 1984, the Virginia General Assembly debated a comparative
negligence bill, House Bill 107, which originally was a pure com-
ed VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2005)); Act of Aug. 22, 1969, ch. 761, 1969 Mass. Acts 685
(codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (2008)).
49. Act of June 8, 1971, ch. 125, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 496 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (2008)); Act of Mar. 24, 1971, ch. 186, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws
862 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-801 to 806 (2003)); Act of June 30,
1971, ch. 668, 1971 Or. Laws 1516 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 31.600
(2006)); Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 206, 1971 R.I. Pub. Laws 786 (codified as amended at R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (2004)).
50. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 16-17; see also Act of June 17, 1973, Pub. Act
73-622, 1973 Conn. Acts 1458 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
572h (2005)); Act of May 3, 1973, ch. 787, 1973 Nev. Stat. 1722 (codified as amended at
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (2006)); Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 146, 1973 N.J. Laws 300 (codi-
fled as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to 5-3 (2008)); North Dakota Comparative
Negligence Act of Mar. 13, 1973, ch. 78, 1973 N.D. Laws 143-44 (codified as amended at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2003)); Act of Apr. 18, 1973, ch. 30, 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws
40 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 §§ 12 to 14 (2005)); Act of Apr. 9, 1973,
ch. 28, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41-43 (codified as amended at TEX. REV. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 (2008)); Act of Mar. 8, 1973, ch. 209, 1973 Utah Laws 710 (codified as
amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (2006)); Act of Feb. 8, 1973, ch. 28, 1973 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 30 (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-109 to 1-1-13 (2005)); Act of
Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 139, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 949 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 4.22.005 (2009)).
51. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 17 (citing Act of Mar. 15, 1974, ch. 240, 1974 Kan.
Sess. Laws 828 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (2007)); Act of Mar. 17,
1975, ch. 60, 1975 Mont. Laws 126 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702
(2005)); Act of May 6, 1975, ch. 69, 1975 N.Y. Law § 1411 (2005)); Act of July 9, 1976, No.
152, 1976 Pa. Laws 855 (codified as amended at PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (2007)); Act
of Jul. 12, 1979, No. 431, 1979 La. Acts 1165, 1166 (codified as amended at LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2323 (2008)); Act of Mar. 21, 1980, ch. 165, 1980 Ohio Laws 594 (codified as
amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (2010)); Act of Jan. 1, 1985, Pub. L. No. 317-
1983, 1983 Ind. Acts 1930-33 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 34-51-2-1 (2008)); Act of
May 17, 1984, ch. 1293, 1984 Iowa Acts 524-25 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. §
668.3 (2008)); Act of Apr. 24, 1984, ch. 237, 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 878 (codified as amend-
ed in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (2008)); Act of July 17, 1984, ch. 384, 1984 Del.
Laws 920 (codified as amended in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (2006)).
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parative negligence statute. This bill was defeated on the house
floor by a vote of 51 to 48.52 House Bill 107 was then redrafted in-
to a modified comparative negligence statute, and subsequently
passed the house by a vote of 56 to 44.5' This bill was subsequent-
ly killed in a senate committee, without reaching a floor vote in
the senate. It may arguably be time to reassess comparative neg-
ligence in Virginia in the General Assembly, by reintroducing
former House Bill 107, and allowing a floor vote in the house and
the senate regarding comparative negligence for the benefit of all
Virginia citizens.
Alternately, the Supreme Court of Virginia also has the legal
right and power to reassess the common law doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence.
Although a large number of states have adopted comparative
negligence by statutory enactment, a number of other states also
have implemented comparative negligence through judge-made
law." In each of these states that have judicially adopted com-
parative negligence, the courts have forthrightly addressed the
propriety of judicial versus legislative adoption. In each case, the
courts have found that contributory negligence is a judicially cre-
ated common law doctrine which can be altered, abolished, or re-
placed by the court which created it, based upon the contempo-
rary needs of modern society.5 5
For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Alvis v. Ribar,
held that the failure to enact six comparative negligence bills in
five years indicated that the Illinois legislature was waiting for
court action." Since the Illinois legislature had failed to pass
comparative negligence legislation, it was the "imperative duty of
[this] court to repair that injustice and reform the law to be re-
52. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. 416 (1984).
53. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. 533 (1984).
54. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar,
421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1982); Hilen
v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d
511, 514 (Mich. 1979); Gustafon v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo,
634 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1981); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C.
1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W.Va. 1979). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, §
1.05 (discussing the history of the judicial adoption of comparative negligence).
55. See generally SPEISER ETAL., supra note 15, § 13:5, at 516.
56. 421 N.E.2d at 895.
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sponsive to the demands of society."" Likewise, in Gustafson v.
Benda, the Supreme Court of Missouri judicially abolished the
doctrine of contributory negligence in Missouri, and judicially
adopted comparative negligence, after remaining "quiescent more
than five years while waiting for the legislature to act."" And the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, in McIntyre v. Balentine, in judicial-
ly adopting a modified form of comparative negligence, stated:
We recognize that this action could be taken by our General Assem-
bly. However, legislative inaction has never prevented judicial aboli-
tion of obsolete common law doctrines, especially those, such as con-
tributory negligence, conceived in the judicial womb. . . . Indeed, our
abstinence would sanction "a mutual state of inaction in which the
court awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits
guidance from the court," ... thereby prejudicing the equitable reso-
lution of legal conflicts.59
It is respectfully submitted that McIntyre v. Balentine is an ex-
cellent illustrative case for the judicial adoption of a modified
form of comparative negligence that the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia might find very persuasive, especially since the supreme court
has rejected other obsolete common law precedents in the past."o
Alternately, the Supreme Court of Virginia might act in tan-
dem with the Virginia General Assembly in rejecting contributory
negligence and establishing comparative negligence in its place.
For example, after the Supreme Court of Illinois judicially adopt-
ed comparative negligence in the case of Alvis v. Ribar," the Illi-
nois legislature also subsequently passed legislation regarding
comparative negligence.6 2 Likewise, after the Supreme Court of
Iowa in 1981 judicially adopted comparative negligence in
57. Id. at 896.
58. 661 S.W.2d at 14-15.
59. 833 S.W.2d at 56 (quoting Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 896).
60. See Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 400, 315 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1984)
(refusing to recognize the archaic and obsolete common law rule that a husband who forci-
bly rapes his wife could not be prosecuted for that crime). "Thus, by statute and case law,
we are free, in essence, to adopt from English common law those principles that fit our
way of life and to reject those which do not." Id.
61. 421 N.E.2d at 898 (adopting a pure form of comparative negligence).
62. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1116 (West 2011) (adopting a modified form of
comparative negligence).
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Goetzman v. Wichern," the Iowa legislature subsequently passed
comparative negligence legislation in 1984.
But whatever approach ultimately prevails-whether this legal
process comes through the Virginia General Assembly, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, or both-it is now time to abolish the ob-
solete and archaic tort defense of contributory negligence in Vir-
ginia and replace it with a comparative negligence defense, based
upon important contemporary legal, social, and public policy rea-
sons. 65
The time has now come, by statute or case law, that "we are
free, in essence, to adopt from [the] common law those principles
that fit our way of life and to reject those which do not."6 6
63. 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982) (adopting a pure form of comparative negli-
gence).
64. 1984 Iowa Acts 524 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3).
65. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Virginia, or
the General Assembly, or both, might also determine whether implied assumption of risk
would continue to constitute an absolute defense, or whether it too should be merged into
a comparative negligence defense. Both the Supreme Court of Montana and the Supreme
Court of Florida merged assumption of risk into comparative negligence. Kopischke v.
First Cont'l Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 687 (Mont. 1980); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293
(Fla. 1977).
66. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 400, 315 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1984).
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